Appellate Court dismisses the appeal: Branka Perc, Aleksandra Pekez Kalinić and Marko Prentović — Gž2 211/26, 22 April 2026

The event marks the Appellate Court’s decision of 22 April 2026 dismissing the appeal and affirming the first-instance judgment. The Basic Court receipt stamp of 30 April is a separate later fact, not service on the appellant.

**DISMISSES** the appeal and **AFFIRMS** the judgment of the Basic Court in Novi Sad P2 1435/2024 of 9 February 2026.

This ruling affirms the Basic Court’s judgment P2 1435/2024 of 9 February 2026. The link permits comparison of the first-instance findings and claim quoted there with the appellate panel’s new reasons and actual operative outcome.

**DISMISSES** the appeal and **AFFIRMS** the judgment of the Basic Court in Novi Sad P2 1435/2024 of 9 February 2026. ### Reasons The first-instance judgment dismissed the claim seeking annulment, as absolutely void, of the full adoption established and declared by the decision of the Self-Managing Community of Interest for Social Protection Novi Sad, no. UP. 03-507/79 of 21 June 1979 in Novi Sad, by which Vasić Milorad, born on 15 February 1941 in Osječani, Municipality of Doboj, and Vasić Gospava, born on 21 August 1932 in D. Klakar, Municipality of Doboj, both residing in Budisava, Petefi Šandora Street 52, adopt the minor Miletić Milivoj and by which the adopted minor Miletić Milivoje receives the new name Vasić Milan; and seeking an order that the defendant, immediately upon receipt of the judgment, issue a decision annulling the decision of the Self-Managing Community of Interest for Social Protection Novi Sad, no. UP. 03-507/79 of 21 June 1979, authorising a subsequent entry in the birth register of the details of the adopters Vasić Milorad and Vasić Gospava of Budisava as the parents of the fully adopted child, the plaintiff here, and that annulment of that decision restore the original birth entry of the fully adopted child, the plaintiff here. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs of the proceedings.

The revision directly challenges Gž2 211/26. Page 13 identifies the appellate attribution of Article 30 conditions to Article 31; pages 5–7 challenge “in any event” and the absence of a specified consent/search basis.

No such consent exists. The second-instance court attempts to fill that gap by stating that the mother “could not have been available to give consent”, while the ad hoc guardian Vera Radovanović consented to adoption. Under the full-adoption regime, however, it is not enough to establish that somebody else signed a declaration. It must be established that the law permits such substitution. Article 42 SAPVAA, governing which provisions of the general adoption regime also apply, as appropriate, to full adoption, does not refer to Article 5, which concerns a guardian’s consent in place of a parent’s in certain situations under the general regime. This means that Article 30(4) remains a specific, strict rule for full adoption. Where one parent is dead or unknown, the other parent’s prior consent is required. The Court of Appeal identified no statutory provision permitting substitution of the known and living mother’s consent with that of an ad hoc guardian under the full-adoption regime. Article 30(4), read with Article 41 SAPVAA, was thereby incorrectly applied. ### 5. The second-instance court confused Articles 30 and 31 of the Adoption Act of SAP Vojvodina In the part of its reasoning rejecting the central ground of appeal, the Court of Appeal states: > “During the proceedings and in his grounds of appeal, the plaintiff mainly argues that the conditions in Article 31 of the aforementioned Act were not fulfilled for establishing his full adoption on 21 June 1979 (...). Paragraph 1 of that provision stipulates that a child below the age of five whose parents are dead or unknown may be fully adopted...” This is incorrect. The content the Court of Appeal attributes to Article 31 is actually the content of Article 30(1) SAPVAA. Article 31 does not govern the status of the child’s parents. It provides that full adoption may be established only by both spouses. This error is not an insignificant technical slip in a peripheral part of the reasoning. It occurs precisely where the second-instance court attempts to answer the main ground of appeal concerning incorrect application of Article 30. A court that rejects the central ground of appeal concerning Article 30 by incorrectly identifying the provision itself, and then avoids determining whether it applies paragraph 1 or paragraph 4, has not correctly applied substantive law. ### 6. The second-instance court did not assess the legal significance of the second adoption in 1984 in relation to Article 40 and the status consequences of full adoption under Articles 35, 37 and 38 of the Adoption Act of SAP Vojvodina Article 40 SAPVAA provides:

The court records a timely appeal challenging the judgment in its entirety. The linked appeal is dated 18 March 2026 and contains the precise objections concerning statutory conditions, the second adoption, evidence and first-instance costs. Its requested relief is distinguishable from the ruling delivered here.

The plaintiff lodged a timely appeal against that judgment, challenging it in its entirety on all grounds provided by law.

Aleksandra Pekez Kalinić is a member of this deciding panel and was also named in the 21 August 2024 decision R.22/24 on the jurisdiction conflict. The earlier decision settled jurisdiction; the present panel, chaired by Branka Perc with Marko Prentović as another member, decides the appeal against the judgment.

The Appellate Court in Novi Sad, in a panel consisting of judges **Branka Perc**, presiding judge, **Aleksandra Pekez Kalinić** and **Marko Prentović**, panel members, in the legal matter of the plaintiff **MILAN PETROVIĆ** of Kragujevac, Kraljevačkog bataljona Street 110, JMBG 2806974800030, against the defendant **CENTRE FOR SOCIAL WORK OF THE CITY OF NOVI SAD**, Zmaj Ognjena Vuka Street 13–17, registration number 08154902, represented by Maja Petrović, a graduate lawyer employed by the defendant, concerning annulment of a full adoption, deciding on the plaintiff’s appeal against the judgment of the Basic Court in Novi Sad P2 1435/2024 of 9 February 2026, at the panel session held on 22 April 2026, delivered the following

The appellate reasons refer to the late Pavle’s divorce statements but deny that he acknowledged paternity. The complete P.1642/76 file allows his statements about the child, his request concerning paternity and Lakatoš Vera’s statements to be checked separately from the absence of a final formal determination.

Article 41 of the Law on Adoption of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina (Official Gazette of SAPV, no. 24/76) provides that a full adoption is void if, when it was established, the conditions prescribed in Article 4 paragraphs 3 and 4, Article 10 paragraph 1, Article 30 paragraphs 1, 2 and 4, and Article 31 were not fulfilled, or while the reasons under Article 11 prohibiting the establishment of adoption exist, or if the prior consent under Article 12 of that law does not exist. During the proceedings and in his grounds of appeal, the plaintiff principally argues that the conditions under **Article 31** of that law were not met for the establishment of his full adoption on 21 June 1979 by the adopters Milorad and Gospava Vasić. This provision, in paragraph 1, provides that a child under five years of age may be fully adopted if the parents are not alive or are unknown, or have abandoned the child and their whereabouts have not been established even after six months from abandonment. Paragraph 4 provides that if one parent is not alive or is unknown, a child under five years of age may also be fully adopted with the prior consent of the other parent. In this court’s view, it was not disputed during the proceedings that Pavle Lakatoš, whom the plaintiff claims to be his biological father, died on 7 November 1978, hence before the full adoption at issue was established. At the same time, despite all the facts to which the plaintiff points—his life with Pavle and the statements in the divorce proceedings of the late Pavle and his wife Veronika—the late Pavle Lakatoš did not acknowledge paternity, nor was it established by a judicial decision. Nor does the fact that the plaintiff was declared heir to the late Pavle Lakatoš by the Municipal Court in Novi Sad’s decision O 196/79 of 23 November 1979 lead to a different conclusion, since the case-file material, the results of the evidentiary

The court uses the mother’s recorded unknown whereabouts and unsuccessful searching years later to conclude she was unavailable for consent in 1979. The contemporary protective dossier records the mother, insurance through her and an address on the reverse of the personal sheet. It supplies the earlier evidentiary context for that inference.

proceedings and the plaintiff’s own testimony show that, after that decision was set aside, a new decision was issued which did not establish that status, although the court had sought information from the guardianship body. Therefore, it could not in any event be considered that, when the full adoption was established on 21 June 1979, the plaintiff had a living or known father. On the other hand, in the adoption proceedings the guardianship body recorded that the plaintiff’s mother had for a long time been at an unknown place of residence. In his testimony the plaintiff stated that he had seen his mother several times in childhood and never thereafter, and that he had lived with the late Pavle until his death. From that it follows that the plaintiff’s mother could not have been available to the guardianship body to consent to adoption. This is also supported by the circumstance that even years later the guardianship body could not find any information about the plaintiff’s mother. Thus the plaintiff’s grounds of appeal alleging that it is unclear whether his case was brought under paragraph 1 or paragraph 4 of the cited provision are not acceptable, bearing in mind that, in the situation described, the conditions for adoption relating to the status of the plaintiff’s parents were in any event met. The first-instance court correctly finds that the guardianship body established fulfilment of all the other conditions necessary for full adoption, which also concern assessment of the prospective adopters by professionals—an educational specialist, psychologist, social worker and doctor. This court finds no inconsistencies in their findings, and the grounds of appeal advanced in that respect are not acceptable.

The court recounts the 1984 adoption but says its validity is outside this case. The linked actual record can be compared with the appeal’s argument about the legal effects of an allegedly valid first full adoption and the author’s primary position that the initial act was void. The claim remains directed at the 1979 act.

Furthermore, given that the plaintiff’s adopters’ marriage was dissolved, that his adoptive mother Gospava Vasić died on 19 April 1983, and that Milorad Vasić stated before the guardianship body on 12 September 1984 that he consented to the plaintiff being given up for adoption, the plaintiff was adopted by Periša and Georgina Petrović on 26 September 1984; the validity of that adoption is not the subject of these proceedings. Accordingly, taking account of all the circumstances and the chronology from the plaintiff’s birth to the establishment of the adoption on 26 September 1984, this court states that there are no grounds to declare the full adoption established on 21 June 1979 void.

The ruling closes with a general statement that the remaining appeal grounds were assessed. The final submission of 12 January 2026 contains the earlier detailed arguments and historical exhibits concerning parental status, the protective file, consent and conflicting roles; these can be compared with the reasons actually given.

For the stated reasons, and because the other grounds of appeal, which this court also assessed, did not affect the correctness and lawfulness of the challenged judgment, applying Article 390 of the Civil Procedure Act, the court decided as set out in the operative part.

The May letter’s reference to a second-instance decision is linked to the existing appellate judgment Gž2 211/26 of 22 April 2026. The source permits comparison with the author’s criticism without treating the official forwarding as agreement with it.

The courts of Serbia have now, through both a first-instance and a second-instance decision, maintained the legal consequences of the 1979 adoption. In substance, Serbia’s judiciary has not corrected the original severance of my Hungarian paternal line. It has confirmed it again.

The court sees no inconsistencies in the professional findings. The linked file contains the complete June 1979 reports by Vera Radovanović, Milosava Gudelj and Cvetko Ratković, allowing the specific origins, family circumstances and predicted environment to be compared with that blanket appellate conclusion.

proceedings and the plaintiff’s own testimony show that, after that decision was set aside, a new decision was issued which did not establish that status, although the court had sought information from the guardianship body. Therefore, it could not in any event be considered that, when the full adoption was established on 21 June 1979, the plaintiff had a living or known father. On the other hand, in the adoption proceedings the guardianship body recorded that the plaintiff’s mother had for a long time been at an unknown place of residence. In his testimony the plaintiff stated that he had seen his mother several times in childhood and never thereafter, and that he had lived with the late Pavle until his death. From that it follows that the plaintiff’s mother could not have been available to the guardianship body to consent to adoption. This is also supported by the circumstance that even years later the guardianship body could not find any information about the plaintiff’s mother. Thus the plaintiff’s grounds of appeal alleging that it is unclear whether his case was brought under paragraph 1 or paragraph 4 of the cited provision are not acceptable, bearing in mind that, in the situation described, the conditions for adoption relating to the status of the plaintiff’s parents were in any event met. The first-instance court correctly finds that the guardianship body established fulfilment of all the other conditions necessary for full adoption, which also concern assessment of the prospective adopters by professionals—an educational specialist, psychologist, social worker and doctor. This court finds no inconsistencies in their findings, and the grounds of appeal advanced in that respect are not acceptable.